We use a novel database to study the timeliness of hedge-fund managers' voluntary performance disclosures. Managers engage in strategic timing: poor monthly returns are reported with delay and sometimes together in clusters with stronger subsequent performance, a form of 'performance smoothing'. We posit that the propensity to delay indicates operational-risk/poormanagement. Consistent with this, a portfolio strategy that buys (sells) funds with historically timely (untimely) reporting delivers 4% annual-style-adjusted returns. Investor flows are also lower following reporting delays, though delays can benefit managers with sufficiently poor performance. We conclude that timely disclosure is an important consideration for hedge-fund managers and investors.
Introduction
How does information flow from hedge fund managers to investors and the broader market? Many hedge fund managers voluntarily report their (otherwise nonpublic) monthly performance results on a regular basis to one or more publicly available databases. Presumably, managers release performance information to garner investor attention and attract new money. An interesting question is the extent to which managers calibrate the flow of this performance information by, for instance, delaying (accelerating) the disclosure of poor (good) performance -and the reaction this engenders on the part of investors. In the paper, we explore the timing of performance releases by hedge fund managers and investigate whether strategic considerations play an important role. Further, from an investor perspective, we examine whether the propensity of some managers to delay information releases is indicative of underlying operational risk and poor management and, therefore, predictive of weak future performance.
A better understanding of the disclosure policies of hedge fund managers is important for several reasons. Hedge funds are significant players in financial markets and the manner in which they choose to release (or not release) performance information is important for investors -and for regulators concerned about the impact of hedge funds on capital markets. From the perspective of investors, it is plausible that disclosure patterns could be symptomatic of managerial quality and, hence, the fund's future performance. More generally, hedge fund disclosure polices may offer insights into information provision by corporations and other entities. For instance, hedge funds have discretion in terms of publicly releasing information and their choices may be instructive about the policies corporations would tend to adopt, in the absence of mandated disclosures.
We conduct our empirical tests using an extensive and novel dataset that identifies the dates of return disclosures made by hedge fund managers to a public database. The dataset is constructed by downloading and archiving the daily updates of the Lipper/TASS database ("TASS") over several months. By monitoring the flow of information to the database on a daily basis, we can identify the exact dates of information release by hedge fund managers and, therefore, the timeliness of performance reporting. The historical updates are necessary because data vendors do not provide the specific dates on which hedge fund managers disclose new performance information to the 1 database, and only provide the most recent update of fund characteristics and the historical timeseries of monthly returns and assets. Our raw sample consists of 1,004 daily updates of the TASS database from January 2009 to March 2013.
Our evidence strongly suggests that managers delay the release of bad news. The average reporting lag -the amount of time elapsed between the end of the performance period and the subsequent disclosure to TASS -is about three weeks (18 days) and significantly larger among poorly performing funds. Fig. 1 illustrates this result graphically: A significant fraction (30%) of disclosures remain outstanding three weeks after month end and, more importantly, these delayed disclosures are associated with poor performance. The average monthly excess return (an equalweighted index) based on the expanding set of reported returns from each month-end falls by about 10 basis points after the third week as managers with the more delayed performance reports are included. 1 It should be noted that the delays we observe concern the reporting to public databases such as TASS. It is possible that hedge fund managers might release information to their existing investors, while delaying a public release. In this case, the incentive of managers to delay public release of poor returns would be aimed at protecting, at least temporarily, the inflows anticipated from new investors.
Multivariate regressions confirm that managers are slower in disclosing poor fund performance, even after controlling for month and fund fixed effects. We also identify several other factors that explain hedge fund manager disclosure rates. Reporting rates are lower among managers of funds with longer lockup and redemption notice periods. The longer reporting lags are consistent with these funds having illiquid assets (see, e.g., Aragon, 2007) that are harder to value, as well as lower nondisclosure costs on account of fewer share redemptions. Younger funds also exhibit longer average reporting lags, possibly indicating greater caution among less-established managers in making public disclosures.
We also find slower reporting among funds that prior studies link to greater operational risk, such as offshore funds, the lack of recently audited financial statements (Brown et al, 2009) , and whether the fund's performance history has been previously restated (Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield, 2013) . Lastly, we find greater reporting lags among funds that display more suspicious patterns in reported returns, including funds with conditional serial correlation in returns and other measures that may be symptomatic of return smoothing (see Bollen and Pool, 2012) . We interpret this as evidence that greater operational risk is associated with the disclosure rates of hedge fund managers.
We investigate the possibility that delay is motivated, in part, by the hope or anticipation of better news to offset the fund's poor performance. In our sample, we find many cases in which managers delay the release of return information and then report the returns at a later date along with the returns of intervening months, which we refer to as 'return clusters'. Such return clusters typically contain either two (about 80% of clusters) or three (about 17%) monthly returns, but are sometimes much longer. The earlier half of a cluster is associated with negative excess returns (-0.22% monthly), while the latter half has positive excess returns (0.15% monthly). Return clusters are therefore associated with reversals of poor performance and, in that sense, are a relatively positive outcome.
Our results show that the below-average performance in the first half of a cluster are driven mainly by the subsample of young funds. This evidence suggests that the strategic motives behind the clustering decision are greatest among less established managers, for whom the incentive to protect their track record and delay releasing negative performance information is the largest.
In addition, we argue that our cluster findings highlight a potential delisting bias in studies of hedge fund performance. In particular, the return patterns associated with clusters suggest that managers may be reluctant to disclose poor outcomes unless they can offset them, at least partly, with good subsequent performance. This suggests that we are less likely to observe the returns of poorly performing funds that do not experience a reversal of performance. Making plausible assumptions and matching observed cluster patterns, we use simulations to assess that the bias in average reported excess returns from non-reporting is likely to be about 2-4 basis points per month or an annualized bias of 24-48 basis points.
We next investigate whether the timeliness of reporting predicts future fund performance. Prior studies find, for instance, that operational risk, such as the failure of operational, control, and accounting systems, is associated with poor performance. 2 Therefore, we might expect a negative relation between reporting lags and future performance, to the extent that reporting lags are re-flective of operational risk. We uncover a strong negative relation between historical reporting lags and future excess returns. For example, a "real-time" portfolio tracking the most timely hedge funds (i.e., bottom quintile of historical reporting lags) delivers average excess returns of 0.10% per month, as compared to -0.20% for the portfolio of the least timely hedge funds. The difference, about 4% per year, is significant and consistently positive across our sample period. Our finding of stronger relative performance among historically timely reporters is stable over time: the Q1-Q5 excess return spread is positive in 37 of the 45 months in our sample period. Using portfolio alphas from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) seven-factor model of hedge fund performance delivers similar findings. We also obtain similar results from month-by-month cross-sectional regressions that control for past performance and other known predictors of hedge fund performance. We conclude that the timeliness of hedge fund manager reporting has significant investment value for fund investors.
Finally, we study whether fund investor flows are related to the timeliness of disclosures. Consistent with a negative performance signal from nondisclosure, we find that net fund flows are significantly lower following delays in disclosure. At the same time, releasing the poor performance information may have led to even lower net flows, given that disclosure delays are found to be associated with a significantly lower flow-performance sensitivity. It appears, therefore, that the manager of a fund with a sufficiently poor performance may be better off by delaying information disclosure. In particular, our regression estimates suggest that reporting delays are justified for a manager with a performance rank less than or equal to 0.77 standard deviations below the mean in each of the prior three months.
Several recent studies focus on the disclosure strategies of hedge funds and, in particular, the issue of distortion of return information. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) show that a fund's exposure to illiquid assets can make reported returns look "smoother" than true, economic returns, and create downward biases in measured return volatility. This performance smoothing can result from nonsynchronous trading of the underlying assets or deliberate behavior by the manager. Bollen and Pool (2008) extend this model to allow for conditional smoothing such that a manager's smoothing behavior is more prevalent when fund performance is poor. 3 Our evidence on reporting delays contributes to this literature by providing direct evidence that reported returns are less informative when performance is poor. In addition, the clustering strategy we identify is a form of performance smoothing, in the sense that the volatility of the average returns reported within a cluster is lower than the volatility of returns reported separately outside of clusters. Our analysis therefore highlights delay, rather than distortions between reported and true, economic returns, as a distinct source of deliberate performance smoothing. Agarwal et al. (2013) and Aragon, Hertzel, and Shi (2013) study the mandatory portfolio disclosures of Section 13(f) hedge fund managers and find that confidentially-held stock positions, which are typically conferred a special privilege to delay disclosure, contain valuable stock price information over the confidential period. In contrast, we study the voluntary return disclosures of hedge fund managers to a public database, and find that reporting delays are associated with worse
performance. An important difference between the two settings is that, in the former, managers must seek formal permission from regulatory authorities to delay the disclosure of 13(f) security positions, whereas delays in disclosure in the latter case is entirely discretionary. Our results suggest that the information content of delays in disclosure depends critically on the specific disclosure environment.
Our paper also adds to the literature on hedge fund flows and performance. For example, prior studies focus on the shape of the flow-response to past performance and its interactions with investor share restrictions. 4 Our findings indicate that both the level and shape of the flow-response is significantly related to the speed with which managers disclose information about fund performance.
Prior studies also find that fund performance is related to fund-level variables, including lockup provisions (Aragon, 2007) , managerial incentives (Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik, 2009 ), systematic risk (Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2011 , 2012 , 2013 , restatements of prior returns (Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield, 2013) , and past performance. 5 Our evidence shows that, in addition to these factors, fund performance is related to managerial delays in reporting fund returns.
Finally, there exists a fairly well developed literature on the disclosure policies of firms. 6 The regulatory regimes under which firms and hedge funds operate is, of course, radically different. While corporate managers have some limited discretion in the timing and quality of information released, they are governed by myriad rules and requirements that come from the SEC, GAAP rules, stock 4 See, e.g., Goetzmann, Ingersoll, and Ross (2003) , Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2004) , Baquero and Verbeek (2009), and Ding et al. (2009) .
5 See, e.g., Kosowski, Naik, and Teo (2007) , Boyson (2008 ), Fung et al. (2008 ), and Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov (2010 .
6 Early and influential papers on the timing of information releases, usually in the context of publicly traded firms, include Ross (1979 ), Grossman (1981 ), Milgrom (1981 , Verrecchia (1983), and Diamond (1985) .
exchanges, threat of shareholder lawsuits and other sources. Hedge fund managers, in contrast, are largely free to set their own disclosure policies to public databases. Hence, the study of hedge fund manager disclosure may have much to teach us about the equilibrium demand and supply of information, since there are relatively few restrictions in place. As it turns out, despite managerial discretion, there is a steady flow of information from many hedge fund managers. While some managers do engage in timing the release of performance information, there are market consequences from delaying the release of information once the fund has (implicitly) committed to providing the information through a data provider such as TASS. A notable difference between funds and corporations, however, is that fund investors can redeem their shares (subject to restrictions), which gives them relatively more control and, presumably, enhances managerial incentives to provide information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses our hypotheses and empirical predictions. Section 3 describes the data used in the empirical analysis. Our main empirical results are in Section 4, while Section 5 concludes.
Hypotheses & Empirical Predictions
In this section, we provide a succinct discussion of our hypotheses. As noted earlier, hedge funds are not generally required to publicly disclose their performance information. Yet many managers do provide their performance and other information on a regular basis to publicly available databases such as TASS. Presumably, the dissemination of performance information serves as a means of attracting new investors and funds. Hedge funds, however, retain considerable leeway in terms of when they release their performance information.
The issue of interest for us is whether hedge funds are strategic in the timing of their information disclosure -that is, do managers seek to delay the release of poor performance information, while accelerating the release of strong performance? Though we would expect investors to respond negatively to such a delay, a poorly performing hedge fund may still benefit by delaying the disclosure of its performance. For instance, the model of delayed disclosures by Acharya et al (2011) would suggest that as long as there is a sufficient probability that delays are being caused by non-strategic rather than strategic motives (e.g., valuation of illiquid investments), there can be an equilibrium in which poor performance corresponds to delayed disclosure.
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As we have noted above, the information that a hedge fund provides existing investors may differ from what is released publicly and it is possible that in many cases existing fund investors know of a fund's poor performance, even if it not publicly disclosed. However, funds will still have the incentive to delay releasing information to public databases, even if the delays are primarily intended to protect new investor inflows. The testable prediction is:
Prediction-1: To the extent that a hedge fund engages in strategic timing, the delay with which a fund releases its return information will be decreasing in the level of its performance, controlling for style and other fund attributes.
Hedge funds, as we show, will sometimes choose to release performance information in the form of a return cluster, whereby the manager delays the reporting of returns of one or more consecutive months and discloses the returns together in a subsequent month. Our conjecture is that return clusters reflect the attempts of managers to delay poor performance until they can report it together with better performance in a subsequent month. To the extent the fund seeks to overcome its prior poor performance, we would expect return clusters to exhibit performance reversals, with poor monthly performance being followed by a relatively good performance. We expect that a fund that obtains a series of poor outcomes will likely stop reporting to public databases.
Prediction-2:
Return clusters are expected to be associated with return reversals, with negative performance in the first part of a cluster being followed by a more positive return performance.
A fund's proclivity to delay the release of its performance information and to engage in strategic timing could be symptomatic of underlying problems, such as operational risk and low managerial quality -and, hence, a predictor of poor future performance. We state the testable prediction as follows:
Prediction-3: Funds that are subject to operational risk and have lower ability managers may also be less likely to produce performance information in a timely fashion. In this case, we would expect that even after controlling for past performance and other fund attributes, funds that are less timely in releasing information will deliver worse future performance than other funds.
Delays in releasing performance information should send a negative signal about fund performance and quality. Hence, we would expect delays to result in more net outflows from the fund.
Since funds often limit redemptions by current investors, we would expect the withdrawals to be 7 greater when there are fewer such restrictions. A fund that does poorly would choose to delay disclosure only if it expected the negative consequences of delay to be less than those of reporting its realized returns. This suggests that fund managers will be more willing to delay disclosure when there are more restrictions on investor withdrawal and when its performance is worse than a certain threshold. We can state: Prediction-4: A delay in the release of performance information will lead to investors having a poorer assessment about the fund manager's ability and to more net outflows from the fund.
However, funds that perform sufficiently poorly will still have the incentive to delay information disclosure.
Data and Summary Statistics
In this section we describe the data used in the empirical analysis, discuss sample selection criteria, and provide summary statistics.
TASS database
Our main data source is the Lipper/TASS database ("TASS"). Although hedge funds are generally not required to make public disclosures, many funds voluntarily report historical performance and other information to commercial data vendors. 7 TASS is among the largest hedge fund data vendors, with over 19,000 funds, and has been used in several prior studies of hedge fund performance.
Performance figures are reported by fund managers to the database, which is updated and made available for download on a daily basis. 8 Each update contains the most recent snapshot of fund characteristics, including the manager's compensation contract, investor liquidity restrictions, and the identity of fund service providers (e.g., administrators). Each update also contains the most recent historical time-series of monthly returns and assets under management (AUM) for each individual fund, including live funds as well as those that have stopped reporting ("defunct").
The novelty of our empirical analysis is that we identify the dates that a hedge fund manager adds new monthly returns to a public database. Although this information is not directly provided 7 One exception is that the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission requires large investment managers, including hedge fund mangers, to disclose certain long positions in U.S. equity securities on a quarterly basis. See Section 13(f) of the Securities Exchange Act. 
Sample selection
We impose other selection criteria to focus our analysis on the strategic disclosure decisions of fund managers. In particular, we exclude all returns from each fund's earliest available snapshot in our sample. This criterion has two effects. First, it excludes all returns that were reported to the database prior to the start of our collection period, and therefore returns for which we cannot accurately measure the report date. Second, for funds that are added to the database during our sample period, the criterion excludes all returns that were generated during the pre-inclusion period ("backfilled data"). 10 Next, for each fund, we exclude all returns after the fund first appears in the returns graveyard database (i.e., "defunct"). This is not to say that we exclude defunct funds, however, since many of our sample funds are ultimately classified as defunct by the end of our sample period. The resulting sample contains 313,244 observations for 12,960 individual hedge funds.
We also detect a few situations in which a manager is already reporting to the database, but subsequently adds monthly performance data from an earlier period, thereby creating backfilled data. We therefore drop all observations from any performance period that precedes the most recent performance period on which the fund has reported. We also exclude all returns corresponding to months before 01/2009 or after 12/2012. We do this to avoid any effects of our collection period on the distribution of reporting lags. The concern is that since our collection procedure begins at Second, we include a dummy variable (Restate) that equals one if the fund restated at least one return in the past, as in Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2013) . Third, we use the first principal component (PrComp) of nine data quality variables that are considered by Bollen and Pool (2009, 2012) . We detail the sources/construction of these variables in the Appendix. 12 Table 8 ). Asset liquidity is unlikely to be the only factor in explaining reporting lags, however, since there is significant within-style variation in reporting lags. 13 Table 2 shows summary statistics for other variables that we consider in our analysis. The pooled average and standard deviation of monthly fund returns are 0.31% and 4.32%, respectively.
Summary Statistics
In comparison, over the same period the S&P 500 has a monthly return mean and standard deviation of 1.08% and 4.96%. The median fund size is $26.8 million and there are several months for which AUM was never reported to the database. Despite positive average returns, monthly fund flows are negative, -0.85%, on average. In Panel B we summarize fund characteristics at the end of our sample period. For example, the average lockup and redemption notice periods are 1.73 months and 28.56 days, respectively. We also find that the majority of funds (92%) use third-party administrators and (in untabulated results) that the presence of a third-party administrator is less likely among older funds. Sixty-two percent of funds are domiciled in offshore financial centers, 18% of funds have a significant December-return spread, 35% of all funds have restated at least one return, and the average number of suspicious return flags equals 1.80 (out of 9). Table 3 shows the pairwise correlations between reporting lag and other fund variables. For example, we find a negative (-6.6%) correlation between reporting lag and return rank, suggesting that worse performance is associated with longer delays. This is consistent with Fig. 1 's finding that the average of all reported returns is decreasing with time following month-end. Note that this 13 Prior studies find that fund of funds underperform other hedge fund style categories, and attribute this underperformance to the double layer of manager fees (Brown, Goetzmann, and Liang, 2004) , misspecified benchmarks (Ang, Rhodes-Kropf, and Zhao, 2008) , and self-selection based on lower manager skill (Agarwal and Kale, 2007) . To rule out any confounding effects that may result from a strong correlation between fund of funds and reporting lags, we present our main results separately for fund of funds and for the rest of the fund sample.
relation is unlikely to be explained by style-specific effects (e.g., fund of funds having lower returns relative to other styles), because we calculate return ranks within each style category and month.
We also find a negative relation between reporting lag and fund age. The longer reporting lags among younger funds possibly reflects greater caution among less-established managers in making public disclosures.
The results are broadly consistent with greater reporting lags when operational risk is high. For example, reporting lags tend to be lower among funds that have recently been audited and are not domiciled offshore. In addition, PrComp has a strong positive correlation with reporting lag (9.2%), and each of the nine suspicious return flags underlying the principal component are individually positively correlated with reporting lags (not tabulated). Reporting lag is also positively related to return restatements. In the next section we investigate these relationships further in a multivariate setting.
Hedge Fund Disclosure: Analysis and Results
In this section we use a regression model of reporting lags to study the timeliness of hedge fund manager disclosures in a multivariate setting. We also examine return clusters -daily disclosures that contain two or more returns -to shed light on whether managers delay the reporting of poor performance in anticipation of reversals from future performance. We then test whether the timeliness of reporting lags are predictive of fund performance, and measure the costs of delay using the response of net investor flows to a lack of timeliness in performance reporting.
Reporting lag regressions
The raw data clearly suggest that several factors are associated with reporting lags. To validate these differences, we report a multivariate regression analysis in which the dependent variable is the natural logarithm of one plus the reporting lag. We include several explanatory variables that are plausibly related to the reporting lag -in particular, the fund's within-style return rank, indicator variables for high-water mark and third − party, variables that reflect operational risk and suspicious patterns in reported returns, and the natural logarithms of one plus age, AU M , lockup and redemption notice periods, incentive and management fee. All models include month dummies and Models 1, 4, and 7 also include fund fixed effects. As noted above, we present results for the full sample of funds, fund of funds, and the subsample that excludes fund of funds. All independent variables (except dummies) are standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance.
The results are reported in Table 4 and strongly show that managers are slower in disclosing poor fund performance. Model 1 shows a coefficient on Return rank of -0.0146, meaning that reporting lags are 1.46% greater per one standard deviation drop in fund performance. Note that this increase goes beyond what one would predict based on the calendar month and the fund's average reporting lag, due to the presence of month and fund fixed effects. Further analysis (not tabulated) shows that this finding is stable across styles and months. In style-by-style estimation, the coefficient on Return rank in Model 1 is negative and significant for all styles categories except Dedicated Short Bias (coefficient is -1.11%). In month-by-month estimation of Model 2, the coefficient is negative for 40 (of 48) months, and the average coefficient is -3.54% (t=-6.80).
Model 2 excludes fund fixed effects to shed light on the fund-level characteristics that are associated with greater reporting lags. We find that reporting lags are greater among managers of funds with longer lockup and redemption notice periods. This finding is consistent with slower disclosure when the funds are less concerned about costs from delay, since greater share restrictions make it more difficult for investors to redeem their shares. The finding is also consistent with longer reporting lags among managers with assets that are harder to value, since funds with lockups tend to hold more illiquid assets (see, e.g., Aragon, 2007).
The remaining coefficients largely validate our univariate comparisons. Model 2 indicates a 15.7% lower reporting lag among funds that have recently been audited, while the reporting lags of offshore funds are 27.2% greater than other funds. In addition, we again find a strong positive correlation between reporting lags and suspicious patterns in returns. A one standard deviation increase in the first principal component of the nine individual data quality flags (P rComp) is associated with a 4.53% increase in reporting lags. Taken together, we interpret this as further evidence that the disclosure of financial results is much slower among funds with greater operational risk.
Although we again find greater reporting lags among the full sample of funds that have previously restated returns, this appears to be driven by Fund of Funds. Another difference from Table   3 is that we do not find a positive relation between third-party and reporting lags. The difference is explained by a strong positive correlation between T hirdparty and Of f shore (30.9%, Table 3 ) and the significantly slower reporting by offshore managers. In fact, for the subsample of fund of funds, we find that reporting lags are significantly lower among funds that use thirdparty administrators, everything else equal.
Return Clusters
In the above analysis we present strong evidence that managers delay the release of poor performance. With a sufficiently long delay, say a month or more, the manager can use the performance in subsequent months, if favorable, to offset the negative information in prior months. In particular, since disclosure is both voluntary and irreversible, we might expect managers to withhold poor performance news in the hope that it is subsequently reversed. In this context, reporting poor performance along with better subsequent returns could be helpful in moderating investor redemptions and limiting the impact on fund profitability and manager fees. In these cases, we would expect poor performance to be often reported along with the performance in subsequent months that, at least partially, reversed the poor performance. In this section, we study such return clusters, defined as a disclosure that contains at least two monthly return observations. 14
Characteristics of return clusters
From the final sample of 289,575 returns we drop an additional 994 returns that were reported in clusters together with other returns from outside our final sample. The resulting sample contains either non-clusters or clusters that only contain returns from our sample period, thereby allowing us to fully characterize the earlier and latter halves of clusters. The final sample contains 11,374 clusters completed over our sample period, and corresponding to 25,604 monthly returns, or, 8.9% of all returns in our sample. Table 5 summarizes the characteristics of excess returns for various subsamples of return clusters. Excess returns are computed by subtracting from fund returns the average return of all funds in the same style category. The first row shows that the earlier half of a cluster (First Half) has a negative average return (-0.22% monthly) while the latter half (Second Half) has a positive average return (0.15% monthly). The difference, 0.37%, is significant. We find a similar difference when we focus solely on fund of funds or the subsample that excludes fund of funds, although the reversal is stronger in the latter group. Overall, return clusters are associated with reversals of poor performance. This suggests that clusters may serve as a way to report 'smoother' performance outcomes: disclosing poor returns with delay in the hope of clustering them with better performance in subsequent months.
Although a large majority (80%) of clusters contain exactly two returns, in Panel A we find a similar reversal pattern among clusters that contain exactly three returns, and also the relatively few clusters that contain four or more returns (t-stat=1.59). 15 The table also presents results for subsamples based on fund age and AUM. Panel C shows that the reversal pattern is mainly concentrated among younger, smaller funds that are not fund of funds. This suggests that the incentive to strategically delay reporting poor performance is greatest among managers that are less established and may be especially concerned about protecting their track record. Among fund of funds (Panel B), we again find that the negative excess returns in the First Half are concentrated among younger, smaller funds. Unlike Panel C, however, these negative returns are not reversed in the Second Half -that is, fund of funds continue to show quite negative returns even in the second half. Overall, the evidence points to strong reversals of poor performance in return clusters that, after excluding fund of funds, become more pronounced and consistent with a strategic delay by hedge fund managers.
Regression analysis of clustered returns
Next we directly test for differences between clustered and non-clustered returns. Specifically, we run the following pooled regression model for the monthly returns in our sample:
where R it is the monthly excess return on fund i during month t, First half is an indicator variable that equals one if the return is part of the earlier half of a return cluster, and Second half is an indicator variable that equals one if the return is part of the latter half of a return cluster. We include fund and month fixed effects in all models. Standard errors allow for heteroskedasticity and clustering at the fund level. Table 6 shows that returns in the earlier half of return clusters correspond to significant below-average performance, of -0.26% monthly. In contrast, the latter half of a cluster corresponds to above-average performance (0.13% monthly), and therefore represents a partial reversal of the lower returns generated during the earlier half. Both effects are significant at the 1% level. Note that these differences go beyond what we would expect based on the calendar month and each fund's average performance, due to the presence of month and fund fixed effects. A similar pattern of negative return reversals is significant for the subsample of fund of funds (Model 4) and the subsample that excludes fund of funds (Model 7).
Next we consider a finer partition of returns. We interact First half and Second half with an indicator variable that equals one if the fund's age is above the sample median (Old ). The results show that the below-average performance in the first half of a cluster is most evident in the subsample of young funds (i.e., Old =0). We also find similar patterns when we replace Old with an indicator that equals one if the fund's AU M is above the sample median (Big). Taken together, the results suggest that the propensity of reporting poor performance together with better performance in return clusters is greatest among managers of younger, smaller funds.
Discussion of cluster results
If monthly returns are independent, then the variance of the average return reported within a cluster must be lower than that of individual monthly returns. In our sample, we find (not tabulated) that the standard deviation of "cluster average returns" is 22% lower than the standard deviation of monthly returns reported individually (i.e., non-clusters). To put this into perspective, compare this reduction in variance with that achievable by recent models of performance smoothing. Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) argue that illiquid asset exposure or deliberate smoothing can lead to distortions between reported and true, economic returns, in which only a fraction of economic returns are reflected in contemporaneous reported returns. As a result, they show that the volatility of reported returns can be much lower than that of true, economic returns. The drop in volatility we observe from clustering would correspond to a smoothing strategy where 27% of the fund's true, economic return is withheld from reported returns. However, the clustering strategy achieves this result through delay, rather than distortions between reported and true, economic returns. 16
16 To see this, note that Getmansky, Lo, and Makarov (2004) express reported returns as
t is the fund's true, economic return in month t and
, where σ is the standard deviation of true, economic returns. Assuming
Our findings also highlight a potential delisting bias in studies of hedge fund performance. In particular, the patterns we document in return clusters suggest that managers are reluctant to disclose the results from prior months of poor performance unless they can also present better performance in more recent months to offset what they have to say. In this case, we are less likely to observe the returns of poorly performing funds that do not experience a reversal of performance.
We investigate this further in the Appendix by considering a simple clustering strategy in which a manager, upon realizing that the fund return falls below a threshold, decides to delay the reporting of the return until the subsequent return is realized. If the sum of the two returns are above a (possibly different) threshold, then the manager reports both returns; otherwise, if the fund does not sufficiently reverse its earlier poor performance, then neither of the returns are reported. Our solution involves finding the two performance thresholds that are consistent with the evidence on reported clusters reported in Table 5 . We find that the bias in the average reported returns that results from non-reporting is 2 to 4 basis points per month, that is a product of a -4% per month expected value of unreported returns times a 0.50% to 1% frequency of unreported returns. This translates into an annualized bias of 24 to 48 basis points, or, 25% of the typical yearly fixed management fee.
Predicting fund performance
The above evidence shows that hedge fund managers delay the reporting of poor performance. In this section we test whether reporting delays are associated with worse future performance. Prior studies find that operational risk has explanatory power for fund performance, where operational risk is defined as the potential losses caused by a failure of operational, control, and accounting systems (see, e.g., Brown et al., 2008 Brown et al., , 2009 Brown et al., , 2012 . These operational risks could also be reflective of an overall lower managerial ability. Hence, we might expect a negative relation between reporting lags and subsequent performance, to the extent that reporting lags are a symptom of operational risk and less able management.
We first compare the returns on portfolios of hedge funds formed on the basis of historical reporting lags computed in "real-time." Specifically, for each sample fund and quarter, we compute K = 1, a reduction in volatility of 22% corresponds to a smoothing coefficient θ0 satisfying: 0.78 = √ θ 2 0 + (1 − θ0) 2 , or, θ0 = 0.73 as the positive root. This corresponds to about a 75% (=(.92-.73)/.26) of one standard deviation below the sample mean of θ0 (their Table 8 ).
the average of all reporting lags corresponding to the available returns reported to TASS. For example, at the end of 2010Q1, historical reporting lags are based on all returns reported to TASS at the end of March, 2010. 17 We then compute the fractional rank of the average reporting lag across all funds in the same quarter and style category, and sort funds into quintiles based on the fractional ranks. For the subsequent three months (2010Q2, in our example), we compute monthly portfolio excess returns as the equal-weighted average excess return across all funds in each quintile. We compute excess returns by subtracting the style average return from the fund's return. To account for potential return restatements since the report date, we the latest available returns as of the end of our collection period (March 2013). Portfolios are then rebalanced each quarter based on the expanded sample of reporting lags. Table 7 presents the results. We uncover a strong negative relation between historical reporting lags and future excess returns. For example, Panel A shows that the portfolio of bottom quintile (i.e., fastest) of hedge funds delivers average excess returns of 0.10% per month. In contrast, the top quintile (slowest) of hedge funds delivers -.20% per month. The difference, 4% annualized, is significant. The spread in the average reporting lags corresponding to the Q1 and Q5 portfolios is also significant (33.89 days). We find similar results for the subsample of funds that have a zero lockup period and a redemption notice period less than than 30 days (Unrestricted ). This suggests that our findings are of practical use for hedge fund investors, because they are not concentrated among funds that impose severe restrictions on investor liquidity. Even so, as in other hedge fund studies, interpreting a long/short portfolio consisting of hedge funds requires more care since it is not possible to short sell a hedge fund. 18 In this case, the spread return may best be interpreted as the return enhancement obtained by an investor that moves his capital from an untimely (Q5) to a timely (Q1) fund.
One concern with using reporting lags to predict fund performance is that funds with greater reporting delays are more likely to stop reporting to the database. This will make it difficult to detect a negative relation between reporting lags and future performance, to the extent that the returns of defunct funds are lower than average. To address this issue we report results for the 17 Note that since the March 2010 return is not reported until April 2010 at the earliest, it would not be included in the 2010Q1 average reporting lags for any fund. On the other hand, since the median reporting lag is less than one month (Table 1) , the 2010Q1 average reporting lag for many funds will include the reporting lag corresponding to February 2010 performance.
18 However, Sadka (2010) notes that a short position can be achievable given information about the fund's underlying positions.
subsample of fund of funds. Fung and Hsieh (2000) argue that the investment returns of fund of funds contain less measurement biases than those of individual hedge funds (see, also, Fung et al., 2008) . The idea is that the investment experience of disappearing funds will be reflected in the returns of fund of funds which, presumably, are themselves less likely to have stopped reporting to TASS. In other words, the investment experience of actual hedge fund investors (i.e., fund of funds) provides a more reliable picture of the investment experience of hedge funds. Table 7 shows that the evidence of predictability is indeed much stronger among fund of funds. In particular, the average portfolio return spread between Q1 and Q5 is 0.52% per month. Nevertheless, excluding fund of funds, we still find a significant positive return spread of 0.20% monthly between timely and less timely funds.
The final rows of Panel A present spread portfolios for various manager subsamples. Prior studies find evidence that hedge fund performance is persistent (Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 2010) . Therefore, our earlier finding that managers delay poor performance suggests that the predictability we document could be performance persistence, since poorly performing funds will likely have longer historical reporting lags. We repeat our tests based on whether the fund has a historical return rank above (Good performers) or below (Bad performers) 50%. Consistent with prior findings of performance persistence, we find that the returns are higher for all quintiles among the ex-ante Good performers. However, the key result here is that we again find a positive and significant excess return spread between the Q1 and Q5 portfolios for each subsample. This suggests that performance persistence is unlikely to completely explain our results.
Next we study whether predictability of average reporting lags is related to the variation in the fund's historical reporting lags. For example, funds that are consistently late in reporting may have worse operational risk as compared to funds that have a few extremely large reporting lags but are otherwise reporting in a timely fashion. We divide our sample based on whether the within-style rank of a fund's range of historical reporting lags (scaled by its historical average reporting lag) is above (Wide range) or below (Narrow range) 50%. We find a positive and significant return spread (.49% per month) for managers that have a narrow range. The spread is also positive for managers that have a wide range of reporting lags, but is smaller and less significant (.14% per month). One possible explanation for the weaker evidence is that a wide range of reporting lags reflect clusters, which by construction have a range of at least 30 days. As shown above, clustering activity is reflective of a reversal of poor performance, and therefore funds that may be less likely to be in distress. This could lead to a weaker association between average reporting lags and future performance among funds that have a wider range of reporting lags.
We explore this idea further in Panel B. Here we again form portfolios based on average reporting lags, but now exclude all reporting lags corresponding to returns reported in return clusters. We retain the forward-looking nature of our portfolio strategy, because we look backward every quarter only at the available reporting lags (this time, ignoring return clusters) that are observable in TASS.
If the clustering strategy is reflective of funds that are no longer in distress, then we should find stronger predictive power of reporting lags after excluding returns that are in a cluster. Panel B shows that this is indeed the case. The excess return spread is 0.47% per month, about 60% greater than the return spread reported in Panel A using the full sample of reporting lags. The refinement also delivers larger spreads for most of the fund subsamples, including the Wide range subsample. Taken together, the evidence strongly shows that the timeliness of reporting is predictive of fund performance, and that the reversals of poor performance observed earlier for return clusters represents a relatively permanent resolution of delay-inducing distress. Lastly, Figure 2 shows that our finding of stronger relative performance among historically timely reporters is stable over time:
the Q1-Q5 excess return spread is positive in 37 of the 45 months in our sample period. 19 We again find a significant Q1-Q5 return spread for the full sample and various subsamples. This provides further evidence that the return spreads we document are not explainable by differences in systematic risk exposure. Overall, we interpret the evidence as consistent with the idea that operational risk, and its association with lower managerial ability, is an important predictor of fund performance. Apparently, the timeliness with which managers voluntarily report returns is a valuable input for hedge fund investor decision-making. 19 The seven factors include the Russell 2000 index return minus the S&P 500 index return (SP500t), the Citigroup Corporate BBB 10+ year index return minus the Fama treasury bond portfolio with maturities greater than 10 years (Bd10Yt), the excess returns (in excess of the risk-free rate) of SP500t, Bd10Yt, and Fung and Hsieh's (2001) bond, currency, and commodity trend-following factors. The trend-following factors can be found at http://faculty.fuqua.duke.edu/ dah7/DataLibrary/TF-FAC.xls.
Monthly cross-sectional regressions
Next we estimate month-by-month cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund performance in the spirit of Fama and Macbeth (1973) . This allows us to further isolate the predictive power of reporting lags from other known predictors of hedge fund performance. In particular, for each month in our sample we estimate the following raw return regression across funds:
where Historical reporting lag i is defined above as the within-style fractional rank of fund i's historical average reporting lag. As control variables we include style dummies, historical average return rank (Historical performance), historical range of reporting lag (Historical range), high-water mark dummy, non-zero lockup dummy, and one plus the natural logarithms of fund age, incentive fee, management fee, and redemption notice period. We measure Historical reporting lag, Historical performance, Historical range, and fund age at the end of the prior quarter. All independent variables (except dummies) are standardized to have a zero mean and unit variance. (Boyson, 2008; Jagannathan, Malakhov, and Novikov, 2010) . Overall, the evidence confirms our earlier analysis of portfolio returns and shows that the predictability we document is separate from other known predictors of fund performance. Table 10 presents the results from estimating equation (2) with an expanded set of control variables that includes all variables from Table 9 , as well as operational risk measures, suspicious return flags, AUM variables, and M axRsq and SysRisk. As noted above, many of these variables, including P rComp, are correlated with reporting lags (Table 3 ). The evidence shows that the additional control variables have little impact on the predictability of historical reporting lag. In particular, a one standard deviation increase in Historical reporting lag is associated with a 6-8% basis point per month decrease in future fund performance.
The results for the remaining variables are generally consistent with prior research. For exam-ple, we find that fund performance is positively related to systematic variance (Bali, Brown, and Caglayan, 2012), and negatively related to offshore status (Aragon, Liang, and Park, 2013) and return restatements (Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield, 2013) . Fund performance is also higher among funds that report AUM to TASS, which is evidence consistent with our overall story that a lack of disclosure conveys negative information about fund performance. Lastly, we do not find a significant relation between fund performance and suspicious patterns in returns, as measured by P rComp. This highlights reporting lags as a useful measure of operational risk, and also suggests that the predictability we find for reporting lags is not driven by less reliable returns data among funds that report in a less timely manner.
Monthly fund investor flows
The above analysis shows that managers delay poor performance. This behavior can benefit fund managers to the extent that delays reduce the flow response of investors to past performance. On the other hand, reporting delays may convey a negative signal to fund investors, thereby decreasing capital flows. To test these predictions we estimate a pooled regression of monthly net investor flows on past performance for the 48 months over 2009-2012. Specifically,
where The key independent variables in Eq. (3) are P erf , Latent, and the interaction of these two variables. We measure P erf using Return rank, the fractional rank of the fund's return relative to hedge funds. This is relevant here, since we would expect the costs from delay to be strongest when investors in the fund can quickly redeem fund shares. Therefore, we report results for the subsample of funds that have a zero lockup period and a redemption notice period less than or equal to 30 days (the sample median). Lastly, as control variables we include month and style category dummies, and also the natural logarithm of fund age, AUM, and redemption notice period. Table 11 reveals that monthly net flows respond positively to past performance. For example, Model 1 shows that a one standard deviation increase in Return rank is associated with an increase in net flows of 0.34% over the subsequent month, above and beyond what one would expect for the same calendar month. A positive flow/performance relation supports the notion that investors move their capital away from poorly performing funds, giving managers with poor returns the incentive to try to curb redemptions by delaying the release of this information. Consistent with delay providing a benefit for fund managers, Model 1 shows that the coefficients on the interaction terms (Perf *Latent) are indeed negative, and significantly so for the second lag of monthly performance.
To understand the economic magnitude of these effects, note that -1.01% (=-.34%-.34%-.33%) is the expected impact on current monthly flows of a one standard deviation drop in performance over the prior three months for a timely (i.e., Latent=0) fund. If, instead, the fund were less timely (Latent=1), the expected impact on net flows would be only -0.39%.
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Discussion of flow results
The coefficient on Latent represents the cost to managers (in terms of flows) from delay. We expect a negative coefficient, because investors will rationally attribute greater delays to poor performance. Consistent with a negative signal from nondisclosure, the coefficient on Latent is negative (-.48%, t=3.25). 21 We can infer the threshold level of performance below which managers choose to delay.
Suppose a manager becomes less timely such that Latent=1. This entails a cost of -.48% during the subsequent months. On the other hand, the reduction in flow response over the same period to the previous three month's performance is .62% (=.13%+.37%+.12%) per one standard deviation drop in performance. Therefore, such a delay is justified for a manager with a performance rank less than or equal to 0.77 standard deviations below the mean in each of the prior three months.
Our earlier analysis shows that signals about future performance are especially bad when reporting delays are unaccompanied by return clusters, because clustering activity could be an indication that managers were successful in emerging from distress and reversing poor performance. Therefore, Model 2 shows the results from our flow regressions after excluding observations for which the fund reported a cluster during the most recent prior disclosure month. We would expect the cost of delay to be more severe among this fund sample, because these funds show delay without any accompanying display of recovery from distress. The results show that the cost of delay is indeed greater (-.56% vs. -.48%) in the subsample that excludes return clusters. Lastly, we repeat our tests for fund of funds and the subsample that excludes fund of funds. Overall, we find a significant cost of delay on net flows for both subsamples, although the magnitudes are larger for the fund of fund sample (Models 3 and 4).
Our evidence shows that a lack of timely reporting is associated with lower subsequent net flows. As noted above, however, we cannot identify the extent to which this is driven by greater outflows of existing investors or fewer inflows from outside potential investors. For example, it is plausible that existing investors in some funds receive their information in a timely fashion through other channels (say, directly from the manager) even though the manager is delaying the reporting of returns to a public database. However, our finding that greater public reporting delays predicts worse fund performance suggests that existing investors have an incentive to monitor the manager's public reporting behavior, even if the manager is reporting to existing investors in a timely fashion.
Conclusions
We decipher over three years of daily voluntary disclosures by hedge fund managers to study how information flows from managers to fund investors and the broader public market. Our empirical results strongly indicate that managers tend to be strategic in the timing of disclosure decisions.
Information about a fund's monthly performance is conveyed about three weeks after month end but the lag can be significantly larger when performance is worse. We also find significantly longer reporting lags when fund investors face greater restrictions on share redemptions, and therefore plausibly when the costs from nondisclosure are low.
Managers may delay reporting poor performance because, in part, they hope that it will be offset by better subsequent returns. Indeed, a significant fraction of hedge fund returns are reported simultaneously in return clusters, and clusters tend to feature strong reversals of poor performance.
This finding has important implications for performance measurement, because it suggests that many periods of poor performance are observable only if the manager subsequently recovers at least part of his losses.
We find that an understanding of hedge fund manager reporting behavior potentially carries significant investment value for hedge fund investors. The reason is that reporting lags may be symptomatic of operational risk and poorer management and, hence, predictive of poor future performance. Our results indicate that funds are (historically) less timely (relative to peers) tend to significantly underperform more timely funds in subsequent months. The predictability we document corresponds to a quarterly rebalancing strategy in "real time" and is present among funds with relatively few restrictions on investor liquidity. This suggests that data repositories can enhance their value to investors by providing information about when managers make voluntary disclosures about fund performance.
Delays in disclosure are associated with significantly lower net fund flows, consistent with investors responding negatively to such delays. At the same time, greater reporting lags are associated with a significantly lower flow-performance sensitivity. We show that a fund with a sufficiently poor performance may be better off by delaying information disclosure. In particular, our regression estimates suggest that reporting delays are justified for a manager with a performance rank less 26 than or equal to 0.77 standard deviations below the mean in each of the prior three months.
Our results are relevant to potential regulatory changes to the disclosure requirements of investment managers, especially hedge funds. For example, requiring managers to report performance in a timely fashion could potentially improve price discovery in the market for hedge fund managers, subject of course to a manager's incentive to produce reliable information without distortion. More generally, the results provide an interesting illustration of the flow of information -and its problems and drawbacks -when the provision of performance information is largely discretionary.
Appendix
A.1. Construction of suspicious return flags
In this section we describe the procedure used to calculate the suspicious return flags. We start with the returns that are found in the TASS database at the end of our collection period -March 30, 2013. We estimate the return flags each year in our sample period -2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012 -using the fund's entire return history through the end of the prior year. For example, a fund's return flag in 2010 is based upon all available returns prior to 2010. A fund must have at least 24 return observations to be included in the estimation. The first flag is based on a two-sided test for whether the monthly return autocorrelation equals zero. Autocorrelation is triggered if the autocorrelation is positive and we reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level. The second flag is based on Bollen and Pool's (2009, 2012) test for whether the return distribution is discontinuous at zero. Specifically, we calculate a histogram for the return distribution and count the number of observations that appear in the first bin to the left of zero. We follow Bollen and Pool (2012) in selecting the optimal bin width. Next we calculate the number of observations that appear in the adjacent bin to the left, and again count the number of observations that appear in the adjacent bin to the right. We then run a two-sided test of the null hypothesis that the difference between the first number and the average of the second and third numbers equals zero (i.e., a "smooth" return distribution about zero). Discontinuity is triggered if the difference is negative and we reject the null hypothesis at the 10% level.
The next flags are based on the December return spread of Agarwal, Daniel, and Naik (2011) and the six data quality measures of Straumann (2008) and Bollen and Pool (2012) . We first round the reported returns to the second digit, and then compute several sample statistics from the rounded returns. To determine whether the sample statistics are sufficiently unusual (and therefore indicative of poor data quality), we run a simulation that draws rounded returns from a Normal distribution with a mean and variance equal to the fund's actual sample mean and sample variance of rounded returns. The simulation involves 10,000 trials. For each trial, we draw the same number of returns as the actual number of fund returns, and calculate the six data quality measures from the simulated returns. Dec is triggered if the actual December return spread -the mean difference between December and non-December returns-is larger than the top 10th percentile of simulated December return spreads. Zero flag is triggered if the actual number of zero returns is more than the top 10th percentile of simulated number of zero returns. Negative is triggered if the actual number of negative returns is less than the bottom 10th percentile of simulated number of negative returns. Unique is triggered if the actual number of unique returns is less than the bottom 10th percentile of simulated number of unique returns. Max. runs flag is triggered if the actual maximum length of a string of identical returns is larger than the top 10th percentile of simulated maximum length of a string of identical returns. Return blocks flag is triggered if the actual number of recurring return blocks of length two is larger than the top 10th percentile of simulated numbers of recurring return blocks of length two. The Uniformity flag is based on a measure of whether the second digit is uniformly distributed between 0 and 9 (see Straumann, 2008) . The flag is triggered if this measure computed from the actual returns is larger than the top 10th percentile of simulated measures.
The final return flag is computed from all 1,004 snapshots of the TASS returns history that we collected over 01/2009-03/2013 . We use the multiple snapshots to identify restatements -that is changes in returns reported for the same fund and month. Following Patton, Ramadorai, and Streatfield (2013), we define a restatement as a change to an earlier reported return of at least one basis points, and that the change is made at least 90 days after the corresponding performance period.
22 The Restate flag is triggered if the fund restated at least one return using all available snapshots as of the prior month. Therefore, once the flag is triggered for a particular month and fund, it takes the value of unity for all subsequent months. Unlike all other flags discussed above, Restate is calculated at a monthly (not annual) frequency. This is because we need all available snapshots to compute Restate (rather than just the final one at March 30, 2013), and therefore we would lose an entire year of our sample period (i.e., 2009) if we were to compute Restate at an annual frequency.
The above analysis delivers ten variables that captures suspicious patterns of reported returns. For parsimony in our analysis, we reduce the number of flags to three by aggregating the nine flags considered by Bollen and Pool (2012) -Autocorrelation, Discontinuity, Zero, Negative, Unique, Max. runs, Return blocks, Uniformity, and CondCorr (defined below) . We do this two ways. First, we use the sum of the all of the nine return flags (Composite). Second, we use the first principal component (PrComp) calculated from the cross section of the nine flags in a given year.
Finally, we discuss the procedure used to calculate M axRsq, SysRisk, and CondCorr. All three variables are derived from the same regression model. We first start with the seven factors from the Fung and Hsieh (2004) model, as well as one-month lagged observations of the seven factors. For each fund, we select the combination of the fourteen possible factors that maximizes the adjusted R-squared in a regression where the dependent variable is the fund's monthly return. The MaxRsq and SysRisk are the adjusted R-squared and explained (i.e., "systematic") variance from each fund's maximal R-squared regression model, respectively. Next we follow Bollen and Pool (2008) and estimate the following regression model of monthly fund returns (R):
where I t−1 = 1 if the month t − 1 fitted value from the fund's maximal R-squared regression model is larger than its mean and zero otherwise. A positive b − coefficient would indicate that the fund's autocorrelation is greater when the fund is performing poorly (as proxied by it's factor-based return), and therefore indicative of the smoothing behavior considered by Bollen and Pool (2008) . We define CondCorr as a dummy variable that equals one if the b − coefficient is positive and significant at the 10% level. As for the other variables discussed above, M axRsq, SysRisk, and CondCorr are re-estimated each year of our sample period (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) using only the available return data that are generated at the end of the prior year.
A.2. Bias estimates from a simple clustering strategy
In this section we discuss the bias in estimates of average monthly excess returns that would result from hedge fund managers following a simple clustering strategy. The clustering strategy we consider allows for both nonstrategic and strategic clusters. A fraction θ of all clusters are nonstrategic. A nonstrategic cluster is when a manager decides to report two returns together for reasons that are unrelated to fund returns -for example, this may depend on the fund's exposure to illiquid assets that require more time to value. On the other hand, a strategic cluster occurs when the manager is concerned that the fund return is below c 1 . This captures the idea that managers behaving strategically will choose to delay the reporting of poor performance (i.e., when R < c 1 ). We assume that, while the returns in nonstrategic clusters are always reported to TASS, a strategic cluster will be reported to TASS only if either the first half of the cluster (R(1)) is above c 1 , or, in case R(1) < c 1 , the sum of the first (R(1)) and second (R(2)) halves of the cluster are above c 2 . This captures the idea that managers behaving strategically will not report poor performance unless, after realizing subsequent performance, the cumulative performance is sufficiently good. The bias can be expressed as follows:
where R is the monthly excess return and E [.] and P [.] denote expectation and probability, respectively. Using the notation of our setup, a return is not reported if and only if it is part of a cluster and both R(1) < c 1 and R(1) + R(2) < c 2 . Given the frequency of nonstrategic clusters (θ), we solve for c 1 , c 2 , and the bias after making a few assumptions about the return distribution. In particular, we assume the following:
• The mean monthly excess return in the first half of a cluster is normally distributed with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of 4.42%. The second half of a cluster is conditionally normally distributed with conditional mean .07 × R(1) and standard deviation √ 4.42% 2 × (1 − .07 2 ).
• The number of reported cluster returns is 17,259 and the number of nonclustered returns is 161,391.
The two assumptions listed above match the empirical data from the sample that excludes fund of funds. In particular, the standard deviation of excess returns is 4.42%, the monthly return AR(1) coefficient is .07, and the number of returns reported in clusters and outside of clusters also match the data. Given the above assumptions and the structure of the clustering strategy, we solve numerically for the two thresholds (c 1 and c 2 ) such that the mean monthly return in the first and second halves of reported clusters match those reported in Panel C of Table 5 (i.e., -.22% and .20%, respectively). Our numerical procedure is as follows. We first draw 250,000 pairs of monthly excess returns according to the distributional assumptions above. We then fix θ and classify the first 250,000×θ observations as nonstrategic clusters, while the remaining observations are strategic clusters. We then search over different combinations of (c 1 , c 2 ) over the intervals c 1 ∈ [−6%, 0] and c 2 ∈ [−6%, 0] in increments of .12%. For each pair of thresholds, we determine the proportion of the strategic clusters that are not reported and, hence, the proportion of nonreported returns within all clusters (denoted by P [not reported|cluster]). Our search ends when we find a pair (c 1 , c 2 ) such that the mean monthly return in the first and second halves of reported clusters -that is, all nonstrategic clusters and strategic clusters for which either 1) R(1) > c 1 or 2) R(1) < c 1 and R(1) + R(2) > c 2 -are each less than .01% away in absolute value from -.22% and .20%, respectively. To calculate the expected value of a non reported return we take the sample mean return contained in all strategic disclosures that are not reported. Finally, we calculate the probability of a nonreported returns as:
, Table 12 reports the estimated bias, cluster thresholds, and components of the bias for different values of θ. Panel A shows that the bias is on the order of 2-4 basis points per month, depending on the frequency of nonstrategic clusters. For example, if 60% of all clusters are strategic (i.e., θ = 0.40), then the following strategy of strategic clustering matches the sample means of the observed return clusters: initiate a return cluster if the fund's excess return (R(1)) is less than -4.68% and, after the subsequent return is realized, then report both returns if their sum exceeds -2.88%; otherwise, if the sum of the two returns is less than -2.88%, then do not report either return. Under this program, the expected value of nonreported returns is a substantial -4.47% per month. The frequency of nonreporting is 0.74%, which implies a bias in the sample mean of observed returns of 3.3 basis points per month. Panels B and C show the results from repeating the same analysis except changing the degree of monthly return autocorrelation. For example, Panel B shows that, under the assumption of zero autocorrelation in monthly returns, the bias in observed returns is somewhat smaller, about 2-3 basis points per month, depending on the percentage of nonstrategic disclosures. On the other hand, the bias is greater (3-4 basis points) when we allow for an AR(1) coefficient of 0.15, and therefore stronger autocorrelation than that observed for the full sample of returns data. Therefore, we find that a 2-4 basis points per month bias in average returns is consistent with a simple clustering strategy and the observed return clusters in our sample. Figure 2 : Monthly style-adjusted returns of portfolios tracking the historical timeliness of hedge fund return reporting. Average reporting lags are calculated every quarter for each fund in our sample using all available reporting lags measured from the start of our sample period (January 2009) until the end of the quarter. Average reporting lags are then ranked across all funds in the same style category and quarter. The Q1-Q5 spread is the difference in monthly excess returns, over the subsequent quarter, between equal-weighted portfolios composed of funds in the lowest (Q1) and highest (Q5) average reporting lag quintiles. Excess returns are computed as raw returns minus the average return across all funds in the same style category, using the latest available returns reported to TASS at the end of our collection period (March 2013). Results are reported using either the full sample of reporting lags (solid line) or the sample of reporting lags that do not correspond to returns that are reported in clusters (dashed line). 
Timeliness of Hedge Fund Reporting by Style Category
The table summarizes the reporting lags of the 289,575 monthly returns over Jan-2009 to Dec-2012 reported by hedge funds to TASS. The reporting lag is the number of days between the report date and the end of the corresponding monthly performance period. The report date is the date of the first non-missing monthly reported return. Summary statistics are reported for the full sample of reporting lags and style category subsamples. % ≥ 30 is the sample frequency of whether the reporting lag exceeds 30 days. % Cluster is the sample frequency of whether the reporting lag corresponds to a return that is reported in a return cluster. 
Summary Statistics of Other Variables
The table summarizes the variables in our analysis. Return is the return reported to TASS on the report date. Age is the fund's age (in years) relative to the fund's inception date. AU M is the fund's assets under management (in $ millions). Flow is the monthly difference between the fund's asset growth and return. Flow observations are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile. Lockup and N otice are the fund's lockup period (in months) and redemption notice period (in days), respectively. Dummy variables are summarized based on whether the fund's management firm or investment advisor is different from the fund's administrator (Third-party), the fund has been audited within the last two year (Audited ), is domiciled in an offshore jurisdiction (Offshore), or accepts money from managed accounts (Accepts). PersCap is the amount of personal capital the manager invests in the fund (in $ millions). MaxRsq and SysRisk measure the fund's maximum adjusted R-squared and systematic variance, respectively. Restate is a dummy variable that equals one if the fund has restated at least one of its returns. Dec is a dummy variable that equals one if the fund has a significant December-return spread. Composite is the sum of nine suspicious return flags considered by Bollen and Pool (2012) . Table 4 Multivariate analysis of hedge fund manager reporting lags
The 
Hedge Fund Excess Returns Reported in Clusters
The table presents summary statistics for the excess returns of 11,374 return clusters over Jan-2009 to Mar-2012 . A cluster is defined as at least two monthly returns reported on the same day. Excess return is the difference between Return and the average Return across all funds in the same month and style category, where Return is the return reported to TASS on the report date. The table also reports the averages of the average return over the earlier (First Half) and latter (Second Half) halves of each cluster, and a t-statistic from testing whether differences between the average return of the first and second halves of a cluster equal zero. In the case of clusters with an odd number of returns, the middle return is classified as in the earlier half of the cluster. Results are reported for the full sample of clusters (All), cluster size (i.e., the number of returns within the same cluster), and top and bottom quintiles based on fund age and AUM. The 
Regressions of Hedge Fund Excess Returns on Cluster Variables
The dependent variable is the fund's monthly excess return. Excess return is the difference between Return and the average Return across all funds in the same month and style category, where Return is the return reported to TASS on the report date. Independent variables include indicators for whether the return is part of the earlier (First half ) or latter half (Second half ) of a cluster, and indicators for whether the fund's age is above the sample median (Old ), and for whether the fund's AUM is above the sample median (Big). Old and Big are measured in the month prior to the return month. Fund and month fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering at the fund level. The table reports results separately for the full sample of funds, fund of funds, and excluding fund of funds. +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. The bottom panel reports p-values from F-tests using the coefficient estimates. Cross-sectional return predictability of individual hedge funds:
Historical reporting lags and other characteristics
The table reports the results from monthly cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund returns on fund characteristics, using the latest available returns reported to TASS before the end of March 2013. The dependent variable is the monthly fund return. Historical reporting lag is the rank of the average reporting lag and is computed for each fund using all available reporting lags at the end of the prior quarter. Averages are then ranked across all funds within the same style category. Historical performance is the fund's average return rank based on all returns reported to TASS at the end of the prior quarter. Return ranks are computed relative to all returns in the same month and style category. Other independent variables include style category dummies and a non-zero lockup period dummy (Lockup dummy). All other variables are defined in Table 2 . Age and AU M are measured at the end of the prior quarter. Historical range is the the scaled range of the reporting lag and is computed for each fund using all available reporting lags at the end of the prior quarter.
We first calculate the range (max minus min) of each fund's reporting lags, and then divide it by the average reporting lag. We then calculate the rank of the scaled range across all funds in the same style category. The table reports the average of the 45 monthly coefficient estimates and Fama-Macbeth t-statistics. Results are reported when Historical reporting lag and Historical range are computed from the full sample of available reporting lags (Models 1-4) and the subsample of available reporting lags after excluding those corresponding to return clusters (Models 5-8). Results are reported separately for the subsample of unrestricted funds, fund of funds, and excluding fund of funds, respectively. Unrestricted funds have a zero lockup period and a redemption notice period less than or equal to 30 days. +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Cross-sectional return predictability of individual hedge funds:
Historical reporting lags, operational risk, and suspicious return flags
The table reports the results from monthly cross-sectional regressions of hedge fund returns on fund characteristics, using the latest available returns reported to TASS before the end of March 2013. The dependent variable is the monthly fund return. The following independent variables are included in all models but not tabulated to save space: style dummies, log(1+Incentive fee), log(1+Management fee), Lockup dummy, log(1+Notice) , log(1+Age), Historical performance, and Historical range (not reported to save space). All other variables are defined in Tables 2 and 9 . AUM dummy and AUM are measured at the end of the prior quarter. The table reports the average of the 45 monthly coefficient estimates and Fama-Macbeth t-statistics. +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Table 11 Monthly net fund flows and TASS reporting delays:
Funds with Few Restrictions Only
The table reports the coefficient estimates from a pooled regression of monthly net fund flows. Fund flows are calculated as the AUM growth rate minus the Return and are trimmed at the 1st and 99th percentile. All independent variables (except dummies) are standardized to have a zero mean and variance of one. Return rank is the fractional rank of the fund's Return across all funds in the same monthly return period and style category, using the latest available returns reported to TASS before the end of March 2013. Latent is the one-month lagged observation of a dummy variable that equals one if the fund has not yet reported the return from the prior month. For example, in June, Latent would take the value of one if the April return is not yet reported at the end of May. AU M , Age, and N otice are the fund's assets under management, age, and redemption notice period, respectively. AUM is measured at the beginning of the year. Results are presented for the subsample of funds that have a zero lockup period and a redemption notice period less than or equal to 30 days. The regression is run separately for the full sample of funds, fund of funds, and excluding fund of funds. With each fund subsample, we also report the results after excluding observations for which the fund reported a cluster during the most recent prior disclosure month (Excluding return clusters). Style and month fixed effects are included in all models. Standard errors account for heteroskedasticity and allow for clustering at the month level. +, *, and ** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels. Estimates of Bias From a Simple Clustering Strategy
The table presents estimates of the bias from a simple clustering strategy that allows for nonstrategic and strategic clusters. A nonstrategic cluster is when a manager decides to report two returns together for reasons that are unrelated to fund returns; a strategic cluster occurs when the manager realizes that the fund return is below a threshold level, denoted by c 1 . Returns in nonstrategic clusters are always reported, but the returns in a strategic cluster are reported if and only if the sum of the first and second halves of the cluster are above a threshold level, denoted by c 2 . The thresholds (c 1 and c 2 ) are chosen such that the expected returns on the first and second halves of the observed clusters are equal to the sample means in Panel C of Table 5 . P nr|clus is the conditional probability that a return is not reported given that it is part of a return cluster, while P nr is the unconditional probability that a return is not reported. Er|nr is the conditional expected return given that it is not reported, and bias is the mean observed monthly return minus the mean of both the observed and unobserved monthly return (i.e., negative one times Er|nr × P nr). Results are reported for different degrees of autocorrelation in monthly returns, including the matched autocorrelation in the data (Panel A), zero autocorrelation (Panel B), and double the autocorrelation coefficient in the data (Panel C). Further details are in the Appendix. 
